

**South Topper and Feva Class Regional Training Group
Residential Training Camp
27-29 October 2023 Hayling Island Sailing Club**

**‘Loss of Group Control and Subsequent Recovery of Dinghies and Sailors’
From Chichester Bar
Saturday afternoon 28th October 2023.**

**Near Miss Report and Recommendations
Author: Alan Williams**

This report provides a narrative description of events, drawn from reports and interviews. Any incident provides an opportunity for reflection and lessons learned and fortunately, on this occasion, all sailors were able to sail the following day.

A review group was formed to identify the factors which led up to the incidents, what happened, lessons learned and to make recommendations.


Terms used in the Report.

RYA- The Royal Yachting Association	RYA Racing- the department responsible for Racing activity within the RYA.
RYA Training – the department responsible for Training activity within the RYA.	RTG - Regional Training Group.
RPM- Regional Performance Manager.	Coach Boat – A rigid inflatable boat used for coaching.
Safety Boat – A rigid inflatable boat used for safety.	HISC- Hayling Island Sailing Club, the ‘Club’.
RNLI- Royal National Lifeboat Institution.	MAIB- Marine accident Investigation Branch.
Topper- a small singlehanded sailing dinghy with one sail. The dinghy is generally sailed by children of the 11–16-year-old age range.	Feva- a small 2 person sailing dinghy with 2 sails and a spinnaker. The dinghy is generally sailed by children in the 11–15-year-old age group.
29er- a very high performance 2 person sailing dinghy. Sailed by more experienced Youth [15-18-year-old], sailors.	Chichester Bar- the ‘Bar’ is an area of shallow water at the entrance to Chichester Harbour which is shallow and notoriously rough / dangerous in strong wind against tide conditions.
Spring Tides- higher high and lower low waters and stronger tidal streams experienced every two weeks.	Dinghy- the alternative name in the narrative for a Topper or a Feva.
Chimet- weather and tidal station on the West Pole at the entrance to Chichester Bar.	

Attachments

Reports are attached. There are some minor inconsistencies in timings, wind strength, locations and recollections which is to be expected. The coaches were not aware that the HISC Duty Manager had sensibly contacted the Coastguard and the RNLI.

Chart Extract of Chichester Harbour



The Classes of Sailing Dinghies involved in the Incident.



Topper



Feva



Narrative Description of the Incidents drawn from Reports and Interviews

The RYA Topper and Feva Class RTGs were operating out of Hayling Island Sailing Club from Friday 27th October until Sunday 29th October 2023.

This was the first training camp of the winter programme for both groups. Some of the sailors were returnees from previous years, and some of the sailors were inexperienced, and new to the programme.

The age range of the sailors was 11 to 15 with most in the 12-14 age group.

The Regional Performance Manager [Duncan West], who is responsible for the South and Southwest Regional Training Group programme, had been at HISC for the day on Friday 27th October to meet with the parents of both groups and catch up with the coaches.

On Saturday 28th October Duncan West had visited Weymouth and Portland National Sailing Academy to talk with parents and coaches of other RTG groups operating out of the Academy.

Wind Forecast

The wind forecast for Saturday 28th October was 15-25 kts from the SSW gradually going South, and strengthening as the day went on, with associated rain squalls.

High water was at approximately 1145 according to Chimet recordings on the West Pole out on Chichester Bar.

Tidal Conditions

High water on Saturday was very high, being in a period of 'spring' tides, augmented by low atmospheric pressure. High water was so high that HISC staff put into effect their flood prevention measures.

In the morning there was wind with tide conditions. During the afternoon, the ebb was running against the southerly wind. This created wind against tide conditions, and very rough seas beyond the Hayling Lifeboat Station, and the shallow waters of Chichester Bar.

Saturday Morning Activity

On Saturday morning the Topper and Feva groups had their first, separate training sessions which went without incident.

The groups experienced 'wind with tide' conditions, which resulted in 'flat water' and relatively benign conditions.

Saturday Afternoon Activity

On Saturday afternoon the conditions were completely different from the morning.

The southerly wind was increasing, and the ebbing tidal stream was very strong, acting like a conveyor belt going south over Chichester Bar and into Hayling Bay.

Timings

Topper Group

launched for the afternoon session at appx 1330-1345. Recovery started at approximately 1430 and were all reported as safely back ashore by 1530.

Feva Group

Launched at approximately 1400 and all sailors were reported as safely back ashore by 1500.

The Topper Group

The Topper group consisted of 14 singlehanded Topper Class dinghies. There were 14 sailors, 3 coaches in coach boats, one parent in one of the coach boats, and a sailor who was not sailing in another coach boat. The third coach boat had one coach onboard.

The group had a shore parent, with whom they had VHF contact.

The Topper group went afloat, launching off the club slipway, and then were reaching back and forward across the wind between the Winner Bank and the beach, just north of the Winner Bank pole, in the main channel. [See chart extract].

One of the Toppers suffered gear failure [top of the mainsail failed] and was escorted back to the slipway by a coach boat.

The Head Coach decided to get the group to bear away and sail downwind. In the process of this happening several Toppers capsized. 5 of the Topper sailors were sent back to the HISC slipway.

The capsized Toppers and the rest of the group totalling 8 sailors were then carried south past the Lifeboat Station, and onto Chichester Bar.

At about this time the HISC Sailing Manager, was in the Club race tower which has an excellent view of the harbour. He noticed the Toppers bearing away to sail downwind, and that a number had capsized.

He recognised that the situation was out of control, and he contacted the Topper coaches by radio and asked if they needed assistance. After a short interval, they requested further assistance.

The Sailing Manager also noted the presence of a rain squall which added to the already challenging conditions.

HISC launched 2 Safety Boats to assist with the recovery. HISC staff could also see that Toppers were being swept out to sea, and the HISC Duty Manager was so concerned that he called the Coastguard.

Hayling Island RNLI deployed 2 inshore lifeboats at 1445 [as noted on the Hayling RNLI Facebook page], to assist where necessary, and a rescue helicopter which was training in the vicinity was also tasked to have eyes on the developing situation.

The RNLI primarily stood by, whilst the coaches and HISC safety boats completed the recovery.

The cover provided by the emergency services is acknowledged and was gratefully received.

Recovery of the Toppers

Several of the sailors were removed from their Toppers, and they were recovered by Topper coaches, and possibly other safety and coach boats. 'Hayling Rescue,' a private operator who was well known to the Club, was also in attendance, and recovered the last Topper and its sailor to be brought ashore.

Locating sailors and dinghies

The Topper group had a shore parent whom they had VHF contact with.

The Feva Group

The Feva group consisted of 9 double handed Feva Class dinghies which were going to sail in the afternoon, and 1 further Feva which chose to stay ashore.

There were 3 coaches in 3 coach boats, which is generally considered a good ratio of coach boats to dinghies. The Feva group also had a shore parent with whom they had VHF radio contact.

The Head Coach had recognised the wind against tide conditions in the afternoon and sensibly intended for the group to sail downwind to the safer waters of the Emsworth Channel.

9 Feva's were completing 'follow the leader' off the Club whilst waiting for 1 additional boat to go afloat. During this time a rain squall with associated stronger wind gusts swept in from the sea, 3 boats capsized and started to drift south towards the RNLI station.

Recognising the developing problem with the capsized dinghies, the Head Coach sent the remaining Feva's to the safety of the beach, and then the coaches set about recovering the 3 capsized Feva's. The first Feva was righted and sailed back to the beach by the sailors, and the second capsized dinghy was recovered by one of the Feva coaches.

The 3rd and final capsized Feva was also being recovered by one of the Feva coaches.

Another Feva Coach was on the way to provide additional support when the coach came across an unattended capsized 29er, which the coach remained with.

The Head Coach removed the 2 sailors to enable the coach to concentrate on the recovery. The coach was attempting to complete an alongside tow with the dinghy in an upright position, and the mainsail was jammed in a hoisted position whilst running before the wind, back towards the RNLI Station. However, in the increasingly rough sea state the Feva was unstable, was capsized by a large breaking wave, and was swept under the coach boat. The Feva rigging/ sail fouled the propellor and rendering the coach boat inoperable. One of the additional HISC safety boats instructed the coach to cut away the Feva because there was a risk that the capsized dinghy might capsize the coach boat in the breaking waves.

The Feva was cut free, drifted out to sea, and was eventually recovered on the Hayling Island Sea front later in the afternoon.

The disabled coach boat could not be started and was initially towed in by the RNLI Atlantic 85 until another coach boat was free to tow the coach boat back to HISC.

Locating Sailors and Dinghies

Throughout the incident the Feva group shore parent was able to account for who was back on shore.

Hayling Island Sailing Club Training Groups

HISC also had 2 of their own training groups training on the same day.

Optimist Group

The coach ran a longer morning session and was in the process of getting ready to launch for a short afternoon session. When the rain squall passed through the Optimist coach noticed

the Toppers and Feva's getting into difficulty and stayed ashore. Subsequently, the Optimist Coaches assisted with the recovery effort.

29er Group

The Club 29er group had been training in the morning without incident and went out again in the afternoon to train over Pilsey Sands, a relatively safe location at the south end of Thorney Island and inland from the Club.

The Club 29er group was supported by 6 coaches in 3 coach boats. Several of the 29ers remained ashore for the afternoon.

When the 29ers attempted to return to the slipway, 2 of the 29ers capsized, and was carried out passed the Lifeboat Station and onto the Bar. One 29er was escorted to the shore at Eastoke Corner on the Hayling seafront, the attending coach boat then went to the assistance of a capsized Topper, and the other 29er was abandoned after the sailors were recovered and taken ashore. The 29er was subsequently recovered having also drifted over Chichester Bar.

Unattended Dinghies

In a situation where sailors are removed from a dinghy, and it is left to float free it is normal practice to mark the dinghy with red and white tape to show others that the sailors have been recovered. During this incident that protocol wasn't followed, most probably because of the difficulty in safely coming alongside capsized dinghies in the rough sea state.

Immediate Aftermath

At 1630 the HISC General Manager who was off duty at the time, held a review with all parties, to reflect and gain an understanding of early facts found. This included, Coaches, HISC safety boat crews, RNLI etc.

Post Incident Communication

The Head Coach of the Feva group contacted the RPM at 1530 with a verbal account of the incident.

The Head Coach of the Topper group contacted the RPM at 1630 with a verbal account of the incident.

The initial reports from the Head Coaches provided very brief details of the incidents and recoveries. The RPM forwarded blank incident report forms to the Topper and Feva Head coaches. The subsequent completed reports were similarly brief, so brief that it appeared that it was only a minor incident.

The RPM reported to the RYA Senior Leadership Team [RYA Racing Manager] by text, which was followed with a phone conversation on Sunday morning.

It is also understood that one of the Optimist parents had contacted the RYA Racing Manager on Sunday to discuss the incident.

The UK Government organisation authorised to investigate incidents and accidents at sea, the Marine Accident Investigation Branch 'MAIB', contacted RYA Training, [the MAIB contact in RYA], to discuss the incident later the following week. The full extent of the incidents at Hayling Island emerged, and it was considered appropriate to complete a more thorough investigation.

The Regional Performance Manager, [Duncan West], then collected more detailed reports from the 3 coaches in each of the RTGs, contacted Hayling Island Sailing Club and received a thorough and effective report and action plan from Hayling Island Sailing Club. Duncan West also liaised with Liz McMaster Chief Instructor Sailing and Windsurfing in the RYA Training department, because HISC is also an RYA Training Centre.

Reports and Reviews

Regional Performance Manager, Duncan West, collated reports from the RYA RTG coaches and received a thorough report and action plan from Hayling Island Sailing Club.

Review Group

Subsequently, a review group was formed to review the incidents and produce a report and recommendations.

The review group included: -

RYA Junior Racing Manager - Chris Atherton

RYA Chief Sailing and Windsurfing RYA Training - Liz McMaster

Alan Williams - independent coach, coach developer, former Head of Plas Menai National Watersports Centre, and former member of the Outward-Bound risk management committee.

It was agreed that Alan Williams would Chair the review group and author the subsequent report and recommendations on behalf of the group.

Scope of the Review

The intention was to establish the facts behind the events, lessons learned, and finally to make recommendations.

The collated reports were distributed to the review group and other RYA Senior Leadership Group members.

The review group met at HISC on 29th November 2023, along with the Commodore and Sailing Manager of Hayling Island Sailing Club. The representatives from HISC were open, helpful, and very approachable.

Thanks also to Regional Performance Manager, Duncan West, who was also very helpful throughout the review process.

Review Findings

Competence of Coaches

The Head Coaches were qualified and experienced coaches who had worked at HISC extensively.

All other assistant coaches were RYA qualified Coaches with varying levels of experience. Some were also instructors within the RYA Recognised Training schemes.

The Head Coaches are contracted to run a winter programme of training. The coaches are often not full-time professional coaches, usually having other employment. In this case, one of the Head Coaches had other employment but was an experienced coach and coach developer. The other Head Coach, a previous podium sailor and medallist is a professional coach.

The assistant coaches had varying backgrounds including from racing and who also hold RYA training qualifications.

The assistant coaches sometimes are available for the whole winter programme and sometimes are available for single weekends.

None of the coaches had previous experience of dealing with the recovery of sailors and their boats in the conditions encountered on Chichester Bar during the recovery.

British Youth Sailing and Operational Guidelines

All coaches are issued with a comprehensive set of 'operational guidelines', which cover all aspects of running RTGs.

Continuing Professional Development

Head Coaches are offered CPD opportunities, including, face to face, online and occasional 'in situ' mentoring.

Regional Training Group Venues

RTGs are mainly run in the autumn, winter, and early spring months where stronger winds, and stress of weather may be more frequently encountered.

Most of the venues used for RTGs are generally quite safe. Regional Performance Managers often use inland or sheltered sea locations, and this should always be considered when working with younger sailors.

Some of the venues used are more 'open sea' based and have associated tidal streams.

These venues need much more consideration and planning to take into account the possible wind and tidal conditions, the experience of the coaches, and the ability of sailors.

Hayling Island Sailing Club

HISC is one of the premier Clubs in the UK, is well known internationally, and is professionally managed.

The Club is located close to the entrance of Chichester Harbour, and close to Hayling and Bracklesham Bays.

The Club has very active training and racing programmes, hosting many national and international championships, which often [in appropriate conditions] use the Bays outside of the Harbour entrance, transiting Chichester Bar.

The RYA has made extensive use of HISC for training and events.

There are certain conditions at HISC which provide challenging conditions and most particularly these are present with an ebbing tidal stream and strong onshore winds from the south through to southeast, which creates rough wind against tide conditions over the Bar.

Weather Forecast, Tidal Streams, and Sea State

When the afternoon sailing initially started, coaches considered the conditions 'sailable'. However, the conditions, and or the sailing ability of the sailors, quickly deteriorated resulting in the multiple capsizes experienced.

The combination of strong ebbing tidal stream, and strong onshore wind made for a very rough wind against tide sea state on Chichester Bar, with breaking waves anecdotally running between 2-4 metres beyond the Lifeboat Station.

Risk Assessment Morning / Afternoon

The Head Coaches completed HISC paper-based risk assessments on Saturday morning.

The Head Coaches handed them in to the HISC Marine Department.

The risk assessments did not consider the wind against tide conditions that would be experienced during the afternoon.

The HISC risk assessment does not explicitly ask for times of High and Low water. Which is an omission. Nevertheless, we would expect Head Coaches to be aware of this information and to incorporate it into their own risk assessments.

HISC Marine Department have a risk assessment protocol – which requires HISC staff to review a risk assessment / operating area for a visiting group if the risk assessment score is higher than a certain number. Because the risk assessments were primarily based on the morning wind with tide conditions the risk assessment ‘score’ was below the review threshold the Topper and Feva groups risk assessments were not checked.

It is current practice to complete one risk assessment for a day, and then dynamically risk assess during the day. However, in venues where the morning and afternoon sessions are likely to experience different environmental conditions and risks, a new risk assessment for the afternoon session should be completed.

The Number of Groups and Operating Areas

There were 4 groups operating from the Club including Toppers, Feva’s, 29ers and Optimists. Given the wind and tidal conditions there were few safe areas for activity to take place during the afternoon.

Alternative Activities

There is no pressure on coaches to run practical activity on the water if conditions are not suitable.

There were several alternative approaches to the afternoon. These included: rotating a small number of sailors afloat at any one time from a safe location, towing or sailing the groups to a safer alternative sailing location [which was the Feva Head Coaches’ plan], or staying ashore and running shore-based activity,

Dynamic Risk Management

Dynamic risk management is an essential component of any coaching. Head coaches must be taking a ‘Big Picture’ view in the ever-changing environment as well as the detail of running a training session.

The wind against tide conditions experienced on Saturday afternoon, should have rung ‘alarm bells’ in the minds of the Head Coaches. They were responsible for young and inexperienced sailors, should have been considering ‘what ifs’ and thinking clearly about the consequences of a loss of group control and capsizes, given the proximity of the main hazard which was Chichester Bar.

Topper Group

The decision by the Head Coach for the Topper Group to sail on the Saturday afternoon halfway between HISC and the Lifeboat Station was simply a bad decision.

The main hazard was Toppers being swept onto Chichester Bar in the event of capsizes. The Head Coach failed to take into account the consequences of capsizes, and where the Toppers would most likely end up if capsized.

5 of the sailors managed to sail back to the slipway. The remaining 8 Toppers were swept out past the lifeboat Station onto and over the Bar and had to be recovered.

Fortunately, and with the help and support of others, the sailors and dinghies were recovered, and able to sail the following day.

The Head Coach has reflected on the incident during a meeting with the Junior Racing Manager.

The Head Coach, recognises mistakes made in the choice of sailing location, acknowledges the main hazard, and associated risks in the event of capsizes, and is grateful for the support rendered by others.

Feva Group

Initially, it was the intention to take the Feva group downwind from HISC, up the Emsworth Channel, to run the session in a safer location. This was a sensible decision.

Unfortunately, whilst waiting for the remaining boats to launch several Feva's capsized. The Head Coach recognised the implications, and after a short delay sent the rest of the boats to the beach. The Head Coach removed the sailors from the 3 capsized Feva's and left the coaches to recover the dinghies.

The Feva Group continued sailing the following day.

The Head Coach has subsequently reflected on the incident during a meeting with the Regional Performance Manager. The Head Coach has worked out of HISC for many years and was surprised and caught out by the strength and effect of the tidal stream. The Head Coach acknowledges that if the Feva coaches had a second person onboard their coach boats, recovery of the dinghies would have been much more efficient.

HISC Sailing Groups

Optimist Group

The coach ran a longer morning session and was in the process of getting ready to launch for a short afternoon session when the rain squall passed through and the Toppers and Feva's got into difficulty. Subsequently the Optimist Coaches assisted with the recovery effort.

29er Group

No information has been gathered on the 29er group afternoon activities, apart from understanding that two 29ers got into trouble on the Bar and had to be recovered.

Injuries and Equipment Damage

No injuries were sustained during the incident in either the Topper or the Feva groups.

One safety boat crew recovering a 29er sustained a minor hand injury.

There was minor damage to the Toppers and the Feva's. The 29ers sustained some mast damage.

Emergency Services the RNLI and Rescue Helicopter

It was very sensible of the HISC manager to call the Coastguard / RNLI, as the situation escalated very quickly and was soon out of control. The consequences could have been much, much more serious. As previously noted, the inshore lifeboats were launched at 1445 and stood down at 1530. It is understood that a rescue helicopter was on station keeping 'eyes on' having been diverted from an exercise. The services of the RNLI and rescue helicopter as previously noted were gratefully received.

Coordination of the Recovery

There were 3 x Topper Coach boats, 3x Feva Coach boats, 3 x 29er Coach boats, 2 additional HISC safety boats, 2 RNLI inshore lifeboats, Hayling Rescue safety boat, the Optimist coach boat and several parent RIB's.

It appears that there were up to 17 vessels afloat involved in the recovery effort, and it must have been challenging for HISC to coordinate the recovery and keep track of who was doing what.

It should also be recognised that it would have been very demanding just handling the coach and safety boats in the steep breaking waves experienced on the Bar.

Communication

Communication afloat was via VHF radio.

When the recovery operation was taking place communication was via handheld VHF's and Exposed coach boat and safety boat radios. When the radio microphones get wet communication can become more difficult.

Mobile phones can also be used; however, they do not provide an 'open net', and when wet can be hard to use.

Recovery of sailors/ dinghies

Several of the coach boats were 'single manned', and drivers experienced difficulty in recovering sailors and dinghies in the rough conditions.

The safety boats were double manned; however, the safety boats had some inexperienced crews onboard.

Recovering the dinghies and the sailors in the rough conditions experienced on the Bar would have been challenging for even the most experienced coaches and safety boat crews.

Major Incident Action Plan

HISC and the RYA have major incident action plans which were tested during the incident and are in the process of reviewed and updated.

Shore Parents

Shore parents did have lists of sailors, but not sail number. Shore parents did not have copies of medical details to hand, due to GDPR guidelines.

The Topper Group shore parent was able to account for the sailors, and the last Topper sailor to be accounted for was brought in by Hayling Rescue.

The capsized Feva group sailors were all easily accounted for by the coaches and shore parent and the sailors were all removed from their boats whilst they were being recovered.

Towing and Recovery

In flat water, towing behind or alongside with sailors onboard the dinghy is effective.

In rough conditions it can be challenging to recover a capsized dinghy and coaches need appropriate expertise.

In rough conditions often the easiest way to tow Toppers and Feva's is to lay the mast of the dinghy 'capsized' onto and secured to the Coach boat. Where more coach boats are present, it is also possible to remove young sailors from a capsized dinghy for their own safety whilst the dinghy is being recovered.

Post Incident Communication

As has been previously noted, the initial reports from the Head Coaches to the Regional Performance Manager appear to have been brief and understated the significance of the incidents.

Subsequently the RPM's initial report to the Senior Leadership Team wasn't representative of the actual events.

Recommendations

Fortunately, on this occasion the sailors, dinghies and other equipment were all safely recovered.

The rough conditions experienced on the Chichester Bar, could have led to an entirely different outcome, and therefore it is essential that there are 'lessons learned', to protect against a reoccurrence of this incident.

It is essential that further reflection takes place, and re-training where required.

The following recommendations are strongly advised to be implemented in a timely manner.

Owner of recommendation	Who	Recommendation	Date Completed
RYA Racing	Racing Managers	Escalation and Emergency action plan to be reviewed	
RYA	Department and Organisation level	There are department and organisation level incident reporting systems within the RYA, these should be reviewed, to ensure effective communication of incidents.	
RYA Racing	Regional Performance Managers	Managers to carefully consider the suitability of venues for training, considering the experience of the coaches and the age groups of the sailors.	
RYA Racing	Junior and Youth Racing Managers	When a coach provides an initial verbal account of an incident to a manager. The manager should ask a range of questions to thoroughly	

		understand the context and seriousness of the incident.	
RYA Racing	Junior and Youth Mangers	Risk Management CPD prior to the beginning of winter training programmes. British Youth Sailing coach guidelines to be reviewed.	
RYA Racing	Regional Performance Managers	BYS Coach Guidelines to be updated and strengthened. Including specific guidance when using open sea and tidal venues.	
RYA Racing	Junior Racing Manager/Regional Performance Manager	Reviews of Head Coach reflections and learning to take place.	
RYA Racing	Junior/ Youth Managers / Coach Development	Online CPD to be organised and run for all RYA RTG junior coaches and Youth coaches detailing risk assessment, dynamic risk management towing and recovery. This should be completed as soon as practicable.	
RYA Racing	Junior and Youth Managers / Coach Development	It was challenging to recover the dinghies from the rough water, further training should be offered to coaches via either practical or online training.	
RYA Racing	Regional Performance Managers	BYS coach guidelines to be shared with venues hosting RYA race training programmes	
RYA Racing Regional Performance Managers Shore parent information	Regional Performance Managers	Shore parents to have access to [paper] copies of sailor details / sail numbers, emergency contact details and sailor medical information in the event of an emergency.	
RYA Racing Head Coaches Risk Assessment	Head Coaches	Morning and afternoon risk assessments to be completed where conditions are known to change or where a significant change in weather	

		is either forecast or anticipated.	
RYA Racing Head Coaches	Head Coaches	Risk assessments should take account of the age and experience of the sailors.	
RYA Racing Head Coaches	Head Coaches	Where a venue specific risk assessment is completed that should be forwarded to the Regional Performance Manager.	
RYA Racing	Regional Performance Managers and Head Coaches	In all but the most benign conditions coaches running junior training programmes should have a second person onboard the coach boat, to assist where required	
All	All	When sailors are removed from a dinghy which is left to drift on its own, where practicable the boat should be marked with red and white tape, and if not, the shore contact should be aware that the sailors have been removed.	
HISC	HISC	HISC Emergency Action Plan to be reviewed and updated. HISC to have sufficient staff on hand to deal with emergency situations.	
HISC	HISC	HISC marine department to always review visiting group risk assessments, advise on hazards and activity locations.	
HISC	HISC	HISC risk assessment forms to have shore parent name and mobile number added.	
HISC	HISC	Explicitly add the times of high and Low water to the risk assessments, which appears not to be explicitly included.	

Alan Williams for the Review Group 14th December 2023.

